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Dependency theory has recently been the subject of
much criticism, and in some quarters the events of the
1970s are interpreted as undermining the very bases
on which its arguments were constructed. This brief
note will suggest: that many of the propositions of the
original theory have been shown to be untenable, but
that as concerns the essence of the approach much of
the critique is misplaced and misconceived; that its
alleged conflicts with Marxist analysis are more apparent
than real; and that the events of the 'seventies actually
strengthen the main propositions of the dependency
approach, although they also demand their further
refinement.
The theoretical and political diversity of the arguments
which have been associated with this school of thought
is such that it is no great task to find formulations and
conclusions with which to disagree. What is more
difficult, more rare and more useful is to distil the
essence of the argument out of the stew of the debate
and to subject it to scrutiny.
As will become obvious, the way one defines this
essence has a direct bearing on how it withstands the
subsequent scrutiny. First, it is important that the
essence be understood historically, since dependency
represents one step in a sequence which started from a
disillusionment with the notion that development would
proceed directly from the integration of the newly
independent colonies into the global market, involving
an early specialisation in primary products and
progressing through some kind of product cycle towards
development and industrialisation. lt soon emerged
that, for most developing countries, such a growth
path was not sustainable since even the lowest politically
viable exchange rates allowed the balance of payments
to be brought into approximate balance only in a
range which involved persistent deflationary pressures
for the internal economy, with the result that a significant
proportion of resources was excluded from direct
participation in that economic sphere which operated
on the basis of international prices. The result was
aptly described, though not explained, by the notion
of dualism.
This reality led to thF almost universal espousal of
import substitution policies, via balanced or unbalanced
growth. along with analytical developments such as
the two-gap models - stressing the special stat us of the
foreign exchange constraintsand concerns about
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dynamic comparative advantage. These all variously
emphasised the importance of state intervention in a
developing country's external economic ties, in order
to accelerate the transformation of relative factor
endowments over time.
However desirable such state intervention might be in
theory, it soon became clear that in practice it frequently
produced the opposite of its proclaimed objectives.
All too often its consequences could not be justified
on political, welfarist or strategic grounds, because it
actually reduced the power of workers and peasants.
and increased the relative incomes of the dominant
classes, whilst inhibiting growth as well.
As one response. the free trade position re-emerged to
proclaim the folly of state intervention, except when it
was designed to facilitate the economy's responsiveness
to international price signals, on the basis of undistorted'
current opportunity costs. An alternative interpretation
was that of dependency. lt consisted of a broad
spectrum of argument and analysis. which stressed the
extent to which state intervention had to be understood
as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
accelerated industrialisation and development of the
periphery.
From this common point of departure there developed
a wide range of arguments to show that such state
intervention would become more difficult insofar as
the influence of international capital continued to be
exerted through such channels as investment, technology.
culture, aid or the military. Further, the thesis was
developed that in most cases the states in question
were dominated by internal interests which used the
continued collaboration with international capital for
their own short-term class interest, rather than any
long-term national one, and that these two sets of
interests stood in conflict with each other.
Although the conclusions which emerged were often
one-sided and ahistorical assertions about the
impossibility of development in the periphery, the
inquiry itself was and is of central importance for the
analysis of development.
Within this literature a central concern with the special
problems arising from the integration of weaker
economies into a system occupied by more powerful
and technically advanced ones quite naturally gave
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rise to an emphasis on the asymmetrical nature of the
relationship which developed in that process. It
emphasised the weak and relatively dependent position
of the less advanced economies and, although here
too there have been extreme and indefensible
statementsespecially those which imply that such
dependence is always equally significantsuch
absurdities should not obscure either the truth or the
importance of this fact.
If the dependency approach is understood as the
approach which poses these issues, and poses them in
a way which recognises the inseparability of their
political, social and economic dimensions, it deserves
further development.
Confusion arose because the debate tended towards a
static view of the world as an immutable hierarchy, a
discounting of the very possibility of national
accumulation generated within the periphery, and an
excessive use of various structural characteristics of
industry to discount the significance of the industrial-
isation which was then occurring. These extreme
positions were treated as synonymous with 'dependency
itself, and when the late 1960s began to produce rapid
and sustained industrial growth in some peripheral
economies it seemed to some that the basis of
dependency had been destroyed. This was not so.
Indeed an analysis of the international context within
which the newly industrialising countries (NICs)
developed, will show that the questions posed by
dependency are still important.
The Critique
A voluminous critical literature has developed over
the past decade, much of it justified and constructive.
The worst tendencies within the debate (which, it is
hoped, have thereby been undermined) are those
given to global and timeless generalisations, alleging
the necessity of net losses from integration, the
permanence of peripheral status and hence the
impossibility of capitalist development, and the universal
necessity for precisely defined socialist forms of state
to achieve an improvement in the level of the forces of
production.
Such ahistorical conclusions may have a certain role
to play in particular political situations, but they are
obviously not defensible as analytical generalisations.
They will not be further discussed, except in the
context of three points raised by Palmas recent review
of dependency Palma 1978!, which is sufficiently
authoritative and comprehensive to serve as a vehicle
for introducing some qualifications into the existing
critical debate.
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The first point concerns Palmas discussion of the
'possibility of capitalist development' in the periphery.
Palmas treatment follows a relatively familiar pattern,
in that it begins with a somewhat technical definition
of capitalism the increase in the productive forces
of social labour, and the socialisation ot that labourand
then readily concludes that by that criterion capitalism
is indeed developing in many, or indeed in most, parts
of the periphery. This is surely true but of little
significance until the nature of that 'capitalism' has
been discussed and analysed. Indeed, the central
concern of dependency must be the analysis of the
specific features associated with a capitalist growth
whose early phases occur in a context where there
already exist powerful industrial centres of production
with far superior technical capacity.
In Palma's discussion, this critical point is effectively
obscured. Although, like Warren before him, he stresses
that this capitalism which is developing represents
capitalist development 'warts and alf, and castigates
those who 'hope that it could produce a just distribution
of income, wealth and powerS, there is little or no
attempt to grapple with the question of whether this
capitalist development has the same warts under all
conditions.
This is made more significant when, in Palmas
description, the warts of capitalism turn out to be
more akin to adolescent acne, since
the increase in real wages which has taken place as
capitalism develops in the advanced countries, and
the internal inducement to invest provided by
technological progress have played a
vita/role in rescuing capitalism from the difficulties
and contradictions which it creates for itself
He adds further that 'the periphery has lin his view!
not played a critical role in producing this result.
When, after this, Palma ends with an agnostic aside to
the effect that the capitalism which is developing in
the periphery will not necessarily yield the same long-
term results, he merely acknowledges and confirms
the problem. since this, then, is politically and analytically
the most important question. In comparison, the question
of whether a technically defined capitalismwhose
social and economic implications remain unspecifiedis
or is not developing, appears as an introverted academic
dispute. In short when he inveighs against those who
confuse the discussion with ethicaf distinctions between
growth and development or with 'a socialist critique of
capitalism in Latin America, he is himself introducing
a fundamental confusion. In effect, the 'analysis of the
obstacles to capitalism in Latin America is interesting
and important only insofar as it moves beyond phrases
about the warts of (an undifferentiated) capitalism.
and makes its specific conditions and the consequent
prospects the focal point of its analysis.
The second point emerges from a consideration of
Palma's full and thorough discussion of the relationship
between dependency and Marxist analysis. Here too
there is an excessive concern with the question of the
possibility of capitalist development, as against the
particularity of capitalist development under specific
conditions. Much is thus made of Marx's now famous
passing reference to India's development prospects.
and even more of Lenin's conclusion that capitalism
was developing in pre-revolutionary Russia. At the
same time little emphasis is placed on the irregularities
and specificities of that process.
1f the analysis of the specific obstacles to capitalist
development in Latin America had been a more
prominent focus of the debate, then the major emphasis
might have shifted away from Lenin's conclusion that
'capitalism' was developing in Russia, to the special
problems which, he argued, would attend Russia's
'late development', namely the weakness of its
bourgeoisie, the effects of competition from the advanced
economies and the resilience of traditional structures.
For the rest of the discussion of Marxian analysis, such
a shift would have induced a greater concern with the
phenomenon of uneven development which plays a
significant role in that body of work. No doubt this
would have rightly concluded that assertions about
static and permanent peripheries were not compatible
with the approach, but at the same time it would have
found strong support for the notion that the contradictory
aspects of capitalist development are always likely to
be unevenly distributed over time. across space and
between sections of the population. Insofar as that is
the legitimate and proper concern of dependency, it
stands in no conflict with Marxian analysis, hut invites
its application to the particular problems of 'late
development'.
Nor is it true that militant assertions made in other
parts of the literature about the conceptual adequacy
of Marx's notions of reserve armies and surplus
populations. challenge the appropriateness of analyses
which stress the particular severity or intractability of
these phenomena under certain specified conditions.
It requires a rather pedantic turn of mind to suggest
therefore that discussion of the problems of the
'marginalisation' of labour are incompatible with Marxian
analysis.
Finally, one must address the question of the status of
the generalisations to be arrived at. Palma inveighs
against 'mechanico-formal' formulations, and along
with Cardoso, seems to be driven back to a study of
the uniqueness of each case. But, as Rodriguez points
out below, this is an abdication, not a methodological
advance, If taken seriously it would contravene the
very conditions which both writers state as essential
for the dependency debate, such as the fact that
the ana/isis there/ore requires primarily an
undeicIanding of the con temporary characteristics
of the world capitalist system.
¡Palma 1978:909, emphasis in original!.
This task is necessarily a simultaneous one, and one
which must constantly concern itself with questions
which can be generalised, and with the appropriate
level of generalisation. Certainly one may agree with
the spirit of the broad conclusions reached by Palma,
which are that one part of the further development of
dependency requires a historical, political-economy
treatment of specific societies, One must agree with
him whole-heartedly when he says that only at this
level can policy options and political positions be
sensibly discussed, and it is right that the possibility of
a wide diversity of results must always be recognised
and more accurately defined. One may also agree with
him when he deplores the way in which the manipulation
of cross-sectional data threatens to engulf all sensible
analyses of development. But one should be concerned
that the solution of concentrating its analysis on what
have been called 'concrete situations of dependency'
is beset by the age-old problem of defining a methodology
or a working set of hypotheses about the context
within which these 'concrete' cases are to be studied.
When he adds that
without a considerable number of concrete studies
am new theory which mar be elaborated concerning
capitalist development in Latin Ame,'ica will
necessarily ftill into the trap of the dialectic of
thought Palma 1978:899!
he surely is seeking an impossible escape from the
dialectic of social scientific inquiry. Any advance
must begin from the point we have reached to date,
and this point includes the capacity to establish some
generalisations and some hypotheses, however much
these may be in need of refinement and development.
Indeed this is the task which the 'concrete' studies
must address.
The Lessons of the Seventies
The developments of the 1970s have been dramatic
and paradoxical. They have brought to an end the
steady-growth. full-employment 'golden-age' of the
post-war boom for the industrialised economies. They
have created the rentier economies of the oil producers,
combining underdevelopment with untold wealth. They
have undermined and destabilised the precarious socio-
economic balances on the basis of which many non-oil
developing countries had maintained an uneasy and
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often tenuous link between growth, balance in their
external accounts and domestic developmental
objectives. Finally, they have thrown up the phenomenal
growth of the NICs, a heterogeneous collection of
economies ranging from Brazil to Hong Kong, whose
main common feature is that they have all achieved a
remarkable and extended expansion of their
manufactured exports.
For dependency analysis, as for other perspectives.
these developments constitute a challenge and an
occasion to enrich and to refine its approach. In
general it is arguable that the two fundamental
propositions of the dependency debate have been
strongly reinforced by these developments: namely
the central importance and the potentially inhibiting
effect of the international context for the process of
development, and the critical importance of 'national'
policy (as earlier defined) in establishing the basis for a
relatively more advantageous dynamic integration
into the global market. At the same time, impossibility
theorems, permanent categories of periphery and
core, universal generalisations about the absence of
technology transfer or of the total lack of national
bourgeoisies in the periphery, have all been revealed
as the gross over-simplifications they always were.
lt may appear surprising to suggest that the 1970s have
underscored the importance of the basic pillars of
dependency analysis, when it is now widely held that
the growth of the NICs constitutes powerful proof of
the benefits of international integration and of the
availability of those benefits to peripheral, techno-
logically backward economies, provided these pursue
appropriate export-promoting policies. The discussion
which follows will suggest that the apparent gulf
between these two conclusions can be narrowed
substantially.
First, there are some points not in dispute. These
include the fact that over this period the pace of
economic development has quickened dramatically in
parts of the periphery, that in these economies
industrialisation has advanced both absolutely and
relatively, and that in a very few cases the process has
generated a shortage of unskilled labour such that the
real incomes of all income earners have been raised
from extremely low levels, and these increases have
been sustained by a movement up the product cycle.
Furthermore there is no dispute about the fact that
these changes have occrred in the context of a
rapidly increasing volume of trade with the international
economy. In short, the 1970s have suggested the
possibility of capitalist development in the periphery.
even Palma's rising-real-wage, technologically mobile
advanced capitalism'.
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However this cannot be understood primarily as the
result of certain trade and export promotion policies
defined in the peripheral economies. Indeed these
developments equally emphasise the importance of
the changing international context, its potential for
inhibiting growth and the importance of national
economic strategies as preconditions for the possible
pursuit of more successful integrationist strategies in a
disequilibrium world. The evidence on the association
between certain types of trade policy and success in
exporting manufactures Bhagwati 19781 raises the
awkward question of the direction of causality involved
in such an association. It is certainly possible that the
trade policies do not explain the success, but that
relative competitiveness (at politically sustainable levels
of domestic consumption and wages) will allow, or
even encourage, such policies to be implemented. In
that case attention should be focused on the determinants
of that competitiveness.
In any case the fact that the NICs comprise a highly
heterogeneous group, all of whose members experienced
a sharp change in their growth and export performance
within a brief space of time, and in conjunction with
other dramatic changes in the international economy.
suggests the need to analyse the phenomenon in its
global context.
That context may first be described from a develop-
mental perspective by contrasting it with the period
which preceded it. Whereas in the earlier period
international capital flows had been heavily dominated
by intra-OECD flows, this is now sharply reduced.
Whereas earlier private capital flows had declined
steadily in importance. they now play a dominant role,
with a shift from equity to loan funding. Whereas
earlier capital flows had been essentially restricted to
resource exploitation, or import substitution, the new
flows more often involve production of manufactures
for export. The NIC phenomenon was both an expression
of. and a vehicle for, these changes. Their dramatic
development was stimulated by the relocation of
production, and consolidated by the associated
development of marketing channels, and of a skill and
infrastructural base where these were fostered and
supported by means of appropriate national policies.
lt was underwritten by the quantities of international
finance, which became available to those economies
that emerged as the preferred locations in this process.
An economy's emergence as a preferred location was
dependent: first, on political reliability, hence the
marked preference for strong military dictatorships:
secondly. on strategic location, either in relation to
the socialist bloc, to major markets, or to major
reservoirs of raw materials; and thirdly, on the existence
of an adequate base of technical and organisational
skill.
The social consequences of such experiences have
varied enormously, depending on the degree to which
labour scarcity was generated, and to which further
growth could be made compatible with the consequent
real wage increases. While Singapore and a very few
others have demonstrated the possibility of 'trickle
down', in most cases this is a remote possibility. In
such cases phenomenal growth rates have combined
with something approaching absolute stagnation for
lower income earners. The question which is posed is
whether the benign sequence is likely, in the real
world, to be generalisable and sustainable. The answer
still looks likely to be negative for most developing
countries.
The future development of the NICs will depend on
both internal and external factors. Some of the internal
factors are rather obvious, and include a continued
increase in skills, investment and productivity. Others
are less obvious. For example, the future is also likely
to depend (in those economies larger than Hong Kong
or Singapore) on the development of a viable agriculture
to ease the pressures generated in the balance of
payments and in the labour markets. This becomes
the more important when international markets and
prices are highly unstable, as that increases the
importance of a reliable food supply and the significance
of a more diversified domestic economic base. At the
same time economic change creates an eventual need
for a move towards more flexible and liberal forms of
political structure, capable of maintaining stability
and continuityforms which have proved to be most
difficult to implement or to control.
Just as changes in the international context set the
process in motion, so they will be important determinants
of the future course of this dynamic phase of peripheral
capitalist development. Among the more important
features will be continued access to developed economy
markets, and to international finance and technology.
Since each of these conditions is currently under
threat it would be as foolish to extrapolate the 'euphoric'
Singapore experience of the past 15 years. as it was to
extrapolate the pessimistic experience of the period
which ended in the mid sixties.
Such issues pose thquestion of why the international
economy has changed as it has. The NIC phenomenon
did after all occur in conjunction with a massive
destabilisation of the international economy as a whole,
which has involved slower growth, unemployment,
large scale industrial over-capacity and sluggish
investment, together with an international accumulation
of financial capital which, in the absence of identifiable
viable investment opportunities (at prevailing or
anticipated prices of course) has fuelled inflation and
speculation. This represents one part of a general
struggle by the accumulated and expanding stock of
financial capital to generate a real return under
conditions where production is expanding unevenly
and slowly. Unfortunately that struggle itself helps
further to worsen the investment climate, by increasing
uncertainty while adding further to the stock of financial
capital seeking its share of a relatively shrinking pie.
The result is to be understood at various levels. Hence
there is class struggle, which attempts to ease the
pressure on capital by reducing labour's share of the
pie through squeezing both the direct and the social
wage (though as in Britain today this may be attempted
in a way which reduces the pie so quickly that even if
capital did manage to get an increased share this
would represent an absolute reduction). The
internationalisation of production plays a part in this
process by effectively reducing the average 'international
wage'. Then there are national' struggles which attempt
to ease the pressure on national concentrations of
capital by shifting the burden onto others. This can be
done by running trade surpluses, which in such a
context critically improve the national investment
climatehence raising relative productivity and
strengthen competitivenessor it may involve practices
known in the 1930s as 'interest rate wars', 'competitive
devaluation', or 'beggar-your-neighbour protectionism'.
Finally, there are sectoral struggles in which those
controlling the production and distribution of crucial
inputs or products exercise their market power to shift
relative prices in their favour.
Currently, the strains imposed by these developments
are becoming critical. The conditions on which the
development of the NICs depended are being
undermined. Their access to markets is being eroded
by protectionism and/or deflation; their access to
credit is being eroded by the consequent doubts about
the future ability of the debtor nations to pay; finally.
access to technology is easing because of the increased
technical capacities of some developing countries, but
at the same time the pace of change may be accelerating
while the move to greater secrecy by the non-seeeking
of patents is an ominous development.
How the various NICs will weather these storms will
depend on a variety of factors. Certainly their ability
to sustain their development may well turn out to he
crucially dependent on the extent to which they pursued
their past export strategies in the context of a nationally
defined long term policy, which captured national
dynamic and external economies, and which placed
the premium on the developnient of national capabilities
to apply and adapt technology, as a basis for creating
the ability to develop it. It may he its very heavy
emphasis on these issues which makes Korea's ability
to confront current problems appear possibly stronger
than that of Brazil. in spite of Brazil's access to foreign
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exchange through its enormous quantities of primary
resources. Only time will tell whether even Korea's
state-directed economy can follow in the footsteps of
Japan. hut if it does it will surely demonstrate not only
the possibility of peripheral capitalist development
including some spread of material benefits, hut also its
cost, and its difficulty, and the importance of a cohesive,
nationalist and internationalist state.
Finally it is hardly necessary to add that the I 970s have
also amply demonstrated the problematic side of
integration for the NOPEC/NONIC (non-oil exporting/
non NICs) group, including most of the African
economies. Whatever may be true of the NICs, for
these economies premature integration could inhibit
and retard their development. socially, politically and
economically, though it need not necessarily dc) so.
Conclusions
This discussion has suggested a number of arguments.
without being able to develop them. Its message is that
the critical evaluation and development of the
propositions which arise from the dependency
perspective should constitute a central task of
development theory in the 1980s. The argument has
emphasised the need to discuss dependency in terms
of the question it poses. rather than in terms of the
answers some of its exponents have at times suggested.
These questions are important both politically and
analytically, and they are questions which traditional
approaches have frequently in practice ignored or
treated as peripheral.
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Even after the experience of the 1970s it is still
important to consider the potential long-term social,
political and economic problems which are raised by
the international integrdtion of technologically backward
economies. Now, as before, that concern should not,
however, obscure the fact that the ultimate objective
must be for the society in question to achieve the
ability to relate to that international system economically,
socially and politically in a way which allows it to
enjoy the undoubted benefits of such integration, but
which is compatible with some politically defined
developmental objectives. The desirable degree and
form of that eventual integration must remain a matter
for dispute and for historically specific definition and
analysis. What seems clear is that, if the objectives
include the provision for the mass of the popuJation of
a minimum income and of some genuine political
power, then the struggle for state power and its use to
modify the impact of international competitive pressures
will remain of central importance.
The 1970s have strengthened the need for a clear
analysis of the effects and the possibilities of integration
into the evolving international systems. Such an analysis
must deal with the process of development in its
historical context, and it must recognise the ultimate
unity of social, political and economic dimensions of
reality. The dependency debate with all its inadequacies
represents the major forum in which such an attempt
is made.
note: for references, see bibliography at the end of this
Bulletin.
